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The Abatement Stakes

Photo: Melody Joy Kramer via Flickr (CC BY-NC-ND 2.0)

Since the current abatement program’s inception in 2000, 10,404 residential properties have seen their abatements expire. All of these were abated and purchased in the 2000 to 2009 period. Because the key rationale for the program is that it is an incentive to improve and expand Philadelphia’s stock of real estate—and thus grow its tax base—it is reasonable to examine what has happened to the values of these properties once their favorable tax treatment has expired.

If their values have dropped significantly, then this provides support to those critics of the abatement who have asserted that the program’s long-term benefits are low relative to its high short-term costs. Alternatively, if abated properties have held their value or even grown in value, then this provides support to the program’s supporters, who have contended that the program’s short-term costs are more than offset by the long-term benefits of a permanently expanded tax base that would not have occurred but for the abatement. This article will endeavor to provide some empirical analysis to inform this debate.

It is first necessary to identify those post-abated units that sold under reasonable market conditions, and hence whose sales prices reflect reasonable market values. Of the original 10,404 dwellings that have since seen their abatements expire, only 3,530 have since subsequently sold. However, in order for this data to be useful in effecting an accurate analysis of how the abatement may affect the value that buyers may place on it, the transactions of these abated dwellings had to meet all of the following conditions:

  1. The initial purchase price of the abated unit had to occur within one year of it being granted an abatement, when the abatement’s benefits were still large;
  2. The subsequent sales price of the abated unit had to occur either in the year its abatement expired or after that;
  3. Both the original purchase price and subsequent sales price had to occur under arms-length conditions;
  4. No unit could transact in between its initial purchase and its subsequent post-abatement sale.

Of the original 3,530 units that transacted more than once, only 1,175 met all of the above conditions for further analysis. This constitutes only 11 percent of all previously abated units, which may seem like an unexpectedly small sample to both critics and proponents of the abatement program. The following map shows the location of these 1,175 previously abated dwellings:

The greatest concentration of post-abated properties is in and around the downtown area of greater Center City. However (perhaps surprisingly to skeptics of the abatement), there are also significant concentrations of formerly abated residences in University City, Northwest Philadelphia and Northeast Philadelphia.

We begin our analysis by providing some general summary statistics on the transaction prices of previously abated properties both before and after their abatements expired. The following table gives some summary statistics on both the initial purchase prices and subsequent (post-abatement) sales prices of these 1,175 dwellings:

In general, it can be observed that the prices of formerly abated units generally increased between their initial purchase and their subsequent post-abatement sale:  

Although, the data indicate that the price of most abated properties increased between the period of their original sale and in their subsequent sale after their abatement expired, there are some caveats: First, it should be noted that there was enormous volatility in house prices during the 2000 to 2017 period since both the largest housing bubble and then the deepest postwar recession occurred during this period. Simply computing the number of increases v. decreases without adjusting for this volatility risks oversimplification of the issue.

Second, if the general level of house and/or condo prices in Philadelphia increased by a larger margin than the value of abated properties during a given period, then this could reasonably be considered a relative loss, despite being an absolute gain. Conversely, if the value of abated properties fell by less than overall house prices during a given period, then that could be considered a relative gain for abated properties, despite being an absolute loss. Just as equity fund managers evaluate the performance of their particular portfolio by comparing it to the overall performance of the stock market, so too is it fair to compare the performance of abated properties to the overall performance of the housing market.

The following chart compares the median prices of all previously abated properties to the median prices of non-abated dwellings (houses and condos) in Philadelphia in two different periods: 2000 to 2008 (when the abatements were in effect), and 2009 to 2017 (after the abatements had expired). To ensure a clean apples-to-apples comparison, only houses and condos that met the same general criteria as post-abated properties were included this analysis.

In general, the price of abated properties increased by less than housing prices citywide during this period:  

While these numbers may indicate an aggregate relative loss in value, they do not provide any insight into the number of individual gainers and losers. To do this, it is necessary to “mark to market” each previously abated property by comparing the percent change in its original purchase price and subsequent post-abatement sale price to the overall percent change in house prices during the same period.

The following chart plots the house price indices for both previously abated properties and all non-abated properties from 2000 through 2017:

The blue line in the index for previously abated dwellings, while the orange line represents the index for non-abated dwellings. The percent change in either index between any two years reflect the general price appreciation (or depreciation) rate of properties in each index. The vertical dashed line in the middle of the chart represents when abatements that were previously granted began to expire after 2008. Hence, the movements in the blue line prior to 2008 represent how abated properties changed in value when their abatement was in effect, while movements in the same line after 2008 represent how these same abated properties changed in value after their abatements expired.  

Using these results, a counterfactual sales price was computed for each property by applying the citywide house price index to the dwelling’s original purchase price. Essentially, the original purchase price was “grown” by the percent change in the index to the dwelling’s actual time of sale. This price represents what each post-abated dwelling would have sold for if it had appreciated at the same rate as non-abated properties. The following table compares summary statistics on actual v. counterfactual sales prices:

The results indicate that abated properties generally appreciated at a slower overall rate than that of the general housing market:  

Using these results, all formerly abated properties were then re-classified as “Relative Gainers” or “Relative Losers” based upon whether or not their percentage change in price pre- and post-abatement either exceeded or lagged the overall percentage change in the housing market’s price index during that same period. The following chart compares the number of relative gainers and losers in each year as abatements expired:

These results indicate that the number of relative losers exceeded the number of relative gainers in each year following the expiration of these dwelling’s abatement.

In summary: Most abated properties generally sold for prices that were higher than their original purchase price once their abatements expired. However, their general appreciation rate has lagged that of non-abated properties.

The results would seem to suggest a number of broader implications about Philadelphia’s abatement program:  

Kevin Gillen, PhD, is the senior economic advisor at Houwzer, a Philly-based real estate agency. He is also a senior research fellow at the Lindy Institute for Urban Innovation at Drexel University.

 

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